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TAGS: [ETTC](#) [EFIN](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [IZ](#) [RU](#) [UK](#)

SUBJECT: ENGAGING GOI ON DRAFT UNSCR FOR TERRORIST FINANCING IN IRAQ

REF: A. STATE 92332
[B.](#) BAGHDAD 2721
[C.](#) STATE 88759

Classified By: Econ Counselor Todd P. Schwartz for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

[¶](#)11. (C) Per Reftel A instructions, Econoff met August 31 with MFA Deputy IO Director Mohammed al-Humaimidi to urge the GOI to accept a different formulation of preamble Paragraph 10 of subject draft UNSC resolution, and to seek GOI agreement on the list of seven names provided by the USG for inclusion in the UNSCR annex. Econoff also raised Chapter VII.

[¶](#)12. (C) Regarding the annex, al-Humaimidi said he was still waiting for final word from the Foreign Minister but expressed confidence that we were close to an agreement. Following our last meeting (ref B), al-Humaimidi submitted a recommendation that the GOI limit its annex to the list of seven individuals/entities proposed by the USG, and save the others for a "second tranche" to be introduced after the UNSCR has been adopted. The US proposal is logical, and it makes little sense to "burden" the UNSC with additional names at this point, al-Humaimidi said. Cabinet has been seized with other issues, but "I don't think there will be a problem" with the annex, he added.

[¶](#)13. (C) Regarding Paragraph 10, al-Humaimidi was less optimistic. He emphasized that the GOI remains very sensitive about any language that might give the impression that Iraq poses a threat to international peace and security. He acknowledged that our suggested formulation (which refers to "those engaged in acts of violence. . .") was an effort to address that Iraqi concern. However, he was not sure that this language would do enough to satisfy the Foreign Minister's (and the Prime Minister's) desire "to avoid even a suggestion" that Iraq posed the threat. The new USG language might move this forward, Al-Humaimidi said, "but my Minister may read it as being on the same track of what we want to avoid." He promised to consult with the FM and get back to us soon.

[¶](#)14. (C) We discussed Chapter VII informally, with al-Humaimidi emphasizing he did not yet have instructions that permitted him to speak for his government. He asked that the USG allow the MFA to continue working the issue for now, and that we not weigh in at a higher level at this point. The Foreign Minister has made the case to PM al-Maliki that the UNSCR must include Chapter VII authorities if it is be legally binding and if the GOI hopes to find a P-5 sponsor that will take the resolution seriously. The PM understands this, al-Humaimidi added. However, the question of Chapter VII has been the subject of "much misunderstanding" in the media and among Iraqi politicians. In the public eye, it is viewed as being linked to "questions of Coalition Forces, occupation, and Iraq being a threat to international peace and security," al-Humaimidi said; this impression is incorrect, but it remains widespread and very sensitive. He said that the FM

appreciated our offer to weigh in at a higher level, and
promised to signal us when and if our intervention would be
helpful.

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